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Abstract—Inspired by the philosophy employed by human be-
ings to determine whether a presented face example is genuine or
not, i.e., to glance at the example globally first and then carefully
observe the local regions to gain more discriminative information,
for the face anti-spoofing problem, we propose a novel framework
based on the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and the
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). In particular, we model the
behavior of exploring face-spoofing-related information from
image sub-patches by leveraging deep reinforcement learning. We
further introduce a recurrent mechanism to learn representations
of local information sequentially from the explored sub-patches
with an RNN. Finally, for the classification purpose, we fuse
the local information with the global one, which can be learned
from the original input image through a CNN. Moreover, we
conduct extensive experiments, including ablation study and
visualization analysis, to evaluate our proposed framework on
various public databases. The experiment results show that our
method can generally achieve state-of-the-art performance among
all scenarios, demonstrating its effectiveness.
Index Terms—Face anti-spoofing, deep learning, reinforcement
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
FACE recognition techniques have been increasingly de-ployed in everyday scenarios for authentication purposes,
such as mobile devices unlocking and door control access.
Compared with other biometric information, using faces for
authentication is more user-friendly as face verification is
non-intrusive, and the face images can be feasibly captured
with mobile phone cameras. However, it has been widely
recognized that state-of-the-art face recognition systems are
still vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Attackers can easily hack
a face recognition system by presenting a spoofing face of a
client to the system’s camera, where a spoofing face could be
a face mask and a face image shown by a printed photo or by
a digital display. Therefore, reliable Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS)
techniques are highly desired and essential for developing
secure face recognition systems.
The past few years have witnessed much progress in the
FAS problem. Traditionally, in either the Spatial or Fourier
space, various techniques have been proposed to extract hand-
crafted features with image descriptors as representations [2],
[3], [2], [4], [5], [6]. These features are usually used to
train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify genuine or
spoofing examples. However, these features are insufficiently
discriminative because those descriptors (e.g., Local Binary
Pattern) are not originally designed for the FAS problem.
Recently, deep-learning-based methods, which aim to learn
discriminative representations in an end-to-end manner, have
shown evidence to be more effective in countermeasures
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1. Presentation attack examples in different scenarios. The examples are
from the ROSE-YOUTU Face Liveness Detection Database [1]. The spoofing
face examples are shown at the bottom of each column, and the cropped faces
are shown at the top. (a) an example of paper mask which is not close enough
to the acquisition camera such that the paper boundary can be spotted. (b) an
example of video attack which is not close enough to the acquisition camera
such that the bezel of the presentation medium (in the left) can be seen. (c)
an example of video attack which is acquired with a camera close enough.
Although no bezel is visible, obvious spoofing clues (e.g. reflections) appear
around the face. (d) an example of print attack. (e) an example of replay
attack. The examples in (d)&(e) are launched carefully such that no paper
boundary, bezel and obvious spoofing clues can be seen.
against spoofing attacks than the traditional methods. Yang
et al. [7] firstly introduce the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) for the FAS task. They train an AlexNet-based model
[8], extract features from the model’s last layer and learn an
SVM with binary labels (“genuine” or “spoofing”) for classi-
fication. Besides using binary labels, Liu et al. [9] seek for the
auxiliary supervision signals. They use auxiliary techniques to
extract pseudo depth maps and remote PhotoPlethysmoGraphy
(rPPG) signals from the RGB images for supervision to boost
the training. It is also reported that the Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) can be used to utilize temporal information from
sequential frames for face anti-spoofing [10], [11]. However,
one limitation of the aforementioned techniques is that the
learned feature representations may overfit to the properties
of a particular database. For example, depth information can
benefit face anti-spoofing when the suspicious input is in 2D
format (e.g., printed photo, screen display), but it is likely to
fail to counter mask attacks, which are with 3D information
(e.g., Fig. 1(a)). To learn more spoofing-discriminative rep-
resentations and alleviate the overfitting effect, we propose a
novel two-branch framework based on CNN and RNN.
A. Motivation
The motivations behind this work are inspired by 1) the ob-
servation that spoofing clues can appear in various ways and 2)
how human beings can act to predict whether a presented face
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Fig. 2. Illustration of how a testee assesses the liveness of a face example
without any apparent distortion. 1) Firstly, the testee will take a glance at
the given face example. 2) The testee may not tell that it is a spoofing
face with certainty because it looks similar to a genuine face. 3) To confirm
the assessment, the testee will take closer observations to carefully search
subtle spoofing clues. After several steps of observations, the testee can
provide a more accurate assessment by increasingly discovering spoofing
clues. Therefore, having observed the example globally and locally, the testee
can make a more reliable assessment than a glance without any closer
observation.
example is genuine or spoofing. Regarding the first motivation,
we show motivating examples in Fig. 1, which indicates that
spoofing clues can be diverse. In occasional cases, spoofing
clues are visually salient, such as the boundaries of a printed
photo, the bezel of a digital display [12], and reflections, which
are respectively shown in Fig. 1(a), Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c).
These clues can be easily spotted and used by human beings
to assess the examples as “spoofing” even without further
careful observation. However, in most cases, human beings
may give prediction with less certainty as the aforementioned
clues may be inconspicuous if an attacker carefully launches
the spoofing attack. For instance, no paper boundary, bezel,
or reflection appears in Fig. 1(d) and Fig. 1(e). Moreover, the
visual quality of Fig. 1(d) and Fig. 1(e) is better than that of
Fig. 1(a), Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c). In other words, Fig. 1(d)
and Fig. 1(e) look more similar to genuine faces, and thus
human beings may not tell the difference with only a glance.
Thus, to mine more information to confirm their assessment,
human beings would carefully delve into local sub-patches to
explore fine-scale and subtle spoofing clues. Fig. 2 portrays
such behavior, which reveals our second motivation.
Under these two motivations, we propose a two-branch
framework, DRL-FAS, that jointly exploits global and lo-
cal features based on CNN, RNN, and deep reinforcement
learning (DRL), for the face anti-spoofing (FAS) problem.
Fig. 3 elaborates on this framework, which corresponds to
Fig. 2. Firstly, we treat human beings’ glance at an example
as the procedure of extracting global features. As such, we
train a CNN to learn global information through the entire
frames from video data. Then, we treat the following closer
observations at suspicious sub-patches as the procedure of
extracting local features. To model such observation behavior,
we leverage reinforcement learning to learn a policy model
that predicts locations of suspicious sub-patches and learn
local information there with RNN. Finally, since human beings
can benefit from both global and local information for better
prediction, the extracted global and local features are fused
for classification.
The contributions of this work are three-fold:
• We propose a novel framework based on CNN and RNN
for the FAS problem. Our framework aims to extract and fuse
the global and local features. While many of the previous
works used RNN to leverage temporal information from video
frames, we take advantage of RNN to memory information
from all “observations” from sub-patches to reinforce extracted
local features gradually.
• To explore spoofing-specific local information, we leverage
the advantage of reinforcement learning to discover suspicious
areas where discriminative local features can be extracted.
To the best of our knowledge, in the field of FAS, this is
the first attempt to introduce reinforcement learning for the
optimization.
• We conduct extensive experiments using six benchmark
databases to evaluate our method. As shown in Section IV-C,
our method can perform better than the schemes that either
use global or local features. Moreover, our proposed method
can generally achieve state-of-the-art performance compared
with other methods.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Traditional Face Anti-Spoofing
Most of the traditional FAS techniques focus on designing
handcrafted features and learning classifiers with learning
methods such as SVM. Texture-based methods are based on
the assumption that there are differences in texture between
genuine faces and spoofing faces due to the inherent nature
of different materials. In the Fourier spectrum, Tan et al.
[5] propose to use Difference-of-Gaussian (DoG) features to
describe the frequency disturbance caused by the recapture.
Besides, Gragnaniello et al. [6] propose to use Local Phase
Quantization (LPQ) to analyze texture distortion through the
phase of images. Also, texture descriptors, such as Local Bi-
nary Pattern (LBP), Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT),
are used in the spatial domain to extract features to represent
such disparities [13], [2], [14], [15], [4]. In addition, due to
the distortion caused during the recapture process, spoofing
examples usually have lower visual quality compared with
genuine ones. Motivated by this observation, the FAS com-
munity also has proposed to detect spoofing attack examples
by assessing the input image quality [16], [17], [18]. Apart
from analyzing a single image, methods based on sequential
video frames are also proposed to utilize the information from
the temporal space, such as eye blinking, lip moves [19], [20],
[21], and motion blurring effect [22]. Although such methods
can be effective against photo attacks, they cannot counter
video replay attacks where such movement information can
exist in a given video.
B. Deep-Learning-Based Face Anti-Spoofing
Recently, deep learning has dominated the computer vision
community, so as the FAS field. Yang et al. [7] are the
first to apply CNN to the FAS problem. The authors train
a deep model based on AlexNet [8] architecture and extract
features from the model’s last layer to train an SVM classifier.
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Fig. 3. Overview of the proposed framework. The backbone and Branch 1
networks are based on CNN, and Branch 2 is based on RNN. The working
pipeline is as follows: 1) The backbone network processes the input X into
the feature map F . 2) Subsequently, Branch 1 extracts global features from
the entire F . Meanwhile, Branch 2 extracts local features from sub-patches
of F recursively. 3) Finally, the extracted global and local features are fused
for the classification in the last fully-connected (FC) layer.
However, this is just a straightforward application of AlexNet,
and the improvement is limited compared with the handcrafted
features. After that, more CNN-based methods are proposed
[23], [24], [25]. Moreover, RNN (e.g., Long Short-Term Mem-
ory networks [26], Gated Recurrent Unit [27]) can also be used
for the FAS problem by leveraging temporal information from
sequential video frames [28], [10]. By far, the aforementioned
methods merely use binary labels (“genuine” and “spoofing”)
for training. Other than that, the methods in [29], [9], [30]
utilize extra information for auxiliary supervision, such as
depth. For example, Atoum et al. [29] introduce auxiliary
depth information for spoofing detection. They hold the idea
that 2D spoofing examples of printed papers and screens are
flat and thus lack 3D information. As such, they train a CNN-
based depth estimator, by which the output toward genuine and
spoofing faces are 3D depth maps and flat maps, respectively.
Although the performance is shown to be improved with
depth as auxiliary supervision, such depth-based methods may
not work efficiently when a paper mask attack with depth
information is launched.
C. Cross-Domain Face Anti-Spoofing
The variety of capturing settings, such as different cameras,
environment illuminations, presentation mediums, etc., can
lead to the domain shift problem [1]. To be specific, a model
trained with data collected under one condition setting may
not be able to generalize to other settings. This problem
deters models from being deployed in practical scenarios.
Aimed at making models more generalized and overcoming
the domain shift problem, transfer-learning-based algorithms
regarding either domain adaptation/generalization or zero/few-
shot learning are also proposed [1], [31], [32], [33], [34],
[35]. However, it is still an open problem regarding how to
design a sophisticated transfer learning algorithm for FAS by
considering all possible capturing settings.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this work, we propose a two-branch framework based on
CNN, RNN inspired by how human beings can act to observe
and explore spoofing clues. The overview of the framework
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Fig. 4. Illustration of Branch 2. It consists of a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
and several linear layers (piθ , L21, L22, etc.). It takes T steps for local
features to be extracted. For each step, the reinforcement learning agent
predicts a location (lxt , lyt ) via its policy model (piθ). Subsequently, at
(lxt , lyt ), a sub-patch from F will be cropped as F(lxt ,lyt ), and F(lxt ,lyt )
will be further processed by the GRU. After T steps, the output hidden state
of the GRU (hT ) serves as the extracted local features to be fused with the
global features for the classification purpose.
is shown in Fig. 3. The backbone network firstly embeds the
RGB image X into a feature map F . Then, F is forwarded
to the subsequent Branch 1 and Branch 2 for the extraction of
global and local discriminative features, respectively. Finally,
these features are fused for the classification purpose in the
final fully-connected (FC) layer. The details of Branch 2
are shown in Fig. 4, where L21 is a convolutional layer,
and L22, L23, L24 and L25 are fully-connected layers. In
Section III-A, we describe how the backbone and Branch 1
work cooperatively to extract global features. Subsequently,
in Section III-B, we illustrate the extraction of local features
from suspicious sub-patches sequentially. Afterward, the rein-
forcement learning leveraged to predict the locations of those
sub-patches will be elaborated in Section III-C. Finally, in
Section III-D, we present the optimization process.
A. Global Feature Extraction
The global feature extraction aims to exploit global dis-
criminative information (e.g., paper boundaries, bezels, salient
reflection patterns). In our framework, global features are
extracted in Branch 1, a sequence of convolutional blocks.
Branch 1 processes F from the backbone to extract global
features fg , into which all elements from F are encoded.
For implementation, we construct the backbone and Branch
1 based on the ResNet18 [36] architecture such that we can
fairly compare our method with the recent ResNet-based meth-
ods (e.g., [24]). In particular, we adopt the first convolutional
layer and four subsequent residual blocks of ResNet18 as
our backbone network. The remaining convolutional residual
blocks and the Global Average Pooling (GAP) layer [37]
constitute Branch 1. The details of these modules are provided
in Table I.
B. Local Feature Extraction
The local features are expected to exploit discriminative
information from a local patch. The local feature extraction
consists of T steps in total. We first elaborate on the pro-
cedure of local feature extraction at a certain step t. At the
beginning of step t, a location (lxt , lyt) is first produced, where
4lxt and lyt represent the horizontal and vertical coordinates
respectively. The learning of the location prediction is via
reinforcement learning, which will be introduced in the next
sub-section. Then, from F , a square sub-patch F(lxt ,lyt)
with the patch size p centering at (lxt , lyt) is cropped. Next,
F(lxt ,lyt) together with the location information (lxt , lyt) will
be encoded to an intermediate feature ft. As such, ft contains
information from the observation at step t.
While previous works usually utilize RNN to leverage
temporal information from sequential video frames, we par-
ticularly employ a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU [27]) to learn
local features from f1,f2, . . .ft in a sequential and recursive
manner. The reason is that the hidden state ht of the GRU
can be learned from ht−1 and ft−1:
zt =sigmod(Wzft +Uzht−1 + bz)
qt =sigmod(Wqft +Uqht−1 + bq)
hˆt = tanh (Whft +Uh(qt  ht−1) + bh)
ht =zt  ht + (1− zt) hˆt,
(1)
where  is the Hadamard product operation, W{z,q,h},
U{z,q,h}, and b{z,q,h} are parameters of the GRU. Further-
more, when analyzing a presented example, human beings’
knowledge with respect to the example grows as information
is gradually gained at each step. In other words, based on
previous observations (f1,f2, . . .ft), their assessment toward
a suspicious example can get reinforced after a new observa-
tion (ft+1). Therefore, we specifically employ the GRU to
memorize the observed information and learn local features.
After T steps, hT is treated as the final extracted local feature
because it has perceived the local information during the T
steps of observations. Finally, the proposed framework jointly
exploits global and local features by fusing hT and fg for the
classification purpose.
C. Reinforcement Learning for Face Anti-Spoofing
To explore spoofing-discriminative local information, we
leverage reinforcement learning to train an agent that can help
predict locations of sub-patches where spoofing clues may
appear. In this context, a reinforcement learning agent is an
abstract subject that explores clues in a certain environment
and predicts locations.
Environment: In our framework, we treat F from the
backbone as the environment where our agent predicts loca-
tions and gets feedbacks to update its policy. This is because
the backbone can distill shallow spoofing-related features from
raw RGB pixels into F . Thus, F can especially provide
spoofing-related information for the agent to predict appro-
priate locations to extract effective local features.
Although an input RGB image (X) can also be set as the
environment, we experimentally find that using the backbone
to extract F and setting it as the environment can provide
better results. We conjecture that raw pixels of an RGB
image may contain interference such that the agent could get
overwhelmed in a complex environment. On the other hand,
the backbone could filter out unrelated information and distill
spoofing-related information from raw pixels, and thus provide
a specific environment F for the agent to explore spoofing
clues with less disturbance. The experimental results in IV-C1
show the superiority of using the backbone and setting F as
the environment.
State: At step t, according to a certain policy, the agent
predicts the location of a sub-patch based on its state st. As
ht carries history action information, we define the agent’s
state as ht: st = ht.
Action and Policy: In the framework, the agent learns
to predict the location of a sub-patch to explore spoofing
information. Hence, our agent’s action at is to predict the
location: at = (lxt , lyt). Then, the sub-patch at (lxt , lyt) will
be cropped for the extraction of local features.
For effective location prediction, an optimal policy pi should
be provided to guide our agent to predict a location according
to its current state: at = pi(st). Following the policy gradient
theory [38], we parameterize pi as piθ by using a differentiable
linear layer, where θ denotes its parameters. In this way, we
can optimize θ with the standard backward propagation based
on reward signals, which will be illustrated later (Section
III-D).
Reward: After predicting the locations, the agent should
get reward signals to evaluate how discriminative the infor-
mation that the sub-patches contain for the classification. The
more effective the predictions, the higher the rewards. Since
the classification is conducted at the final step, we define a
delayed reward as
rt =
{
0, if t < T
logP (ygt|X), if t = T, (2)
where rt is the reward signal at step t, T is the total number
of observation steps, ygt is the ground-truth label of X , and P
is the predicted probability distribution over the binary labels.
The agent will be trained to gain the cumulative reward
R = ΣTt=1rt = logP (ygt|X) (3)
as high as possible.
D. Training and Optimization
1) Two-stage training scheme: When optimizing our frame-
work, although end-to-end training is achievable, it may not
provide satisfactory performance. As mentioned, the output
feature map F from the backbone can be seen as an environ-
ment where our agent acts to learn its policy. If the backbone is
involved in training, the environment will be unstable. Assume
that the training is in epoch i, piθ is optimized according to the
“environment” Fi. However, if the backbone is also involved
in optimization, the “environment” will change in the next
epoch, meaning that Fi+1 6= Fi. Therefore, the agent may not
act properly to the new “environment” Fi+1 with the policy
learned from the Fi.
To tackle this problem, we propose to use a two-stage
training scheme. At the first stage, we pretrain a ResNet18
model with the training data. Then, the parameters of the
corresponding modules will be loaded to the backbone from
the pretrained model. Subsequently, the parameters of the
backbone will be frozen and not involved in the second-
stage optimization such that Fi+1 = Fi. As such, fixing the
5parameters of the backbone is to fix F , which can help keep a
stable “environment” and extract more effective local features.
The experimental results in Section IV-C show the superiority
of our two-stage training.
2) Joint optimization: At the second stage, we optimize
the parameters of Branch 1 and 2 jointly. The parameters
of Branch 1 and Branch 2 except piθ are optimized by the
standard cross-entropy loss with binary labels for supervision.
As for piθ, it is optimized with reinforcement learning. The
optimization of piθ can be formulated as the maximizing of
the following objective function:
J(θ) = Eρ(s1:T ;θ)[R], (4)
where ρ(s1:t;θ) is the distribution over action sequences,
which depends on piθ.
According to the policy gradient theory [38], we adopt a
differentiable linear layer to approximate the policy function.
Hence, the maximization of J(θ) can be via the calculation
of the gradient of J(θ) and the application of the gradient
ascend. To this end, we leverage the REINFORCE rule [39]
to approximate the gradient of J(θ):
∇θJ(θ) =
T∑
t=1
Eρ(s1:t;θ)[∇θ log piθ(at|s1:t;θ)R]
≈
T∑
t=1
∇θ log piθ(at|s1:t;θ)R.
(5)
As the gradient of J(θ) can be simply computed by
∇θ log piθ(at|s1:t;θ). Thus, piθ can be optimized by the stan-
dard backward propagation with this approximated gradient.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes how we conduct experiments to
evaluate our method. To begin with, we introduce six bench-
mark databases employed in the experiments. After that, we
illustrate the implementation details. Finally, we present and
discuss the experimental results.
A. Databases
We utilize six publicly available face presentation attack
databases in our experiments, including CASIA Face Anti-
Spoofing Database [40], IDIAP REPLAY-ATTACK [3], MSU
Mobile Face Spoofing Database [17], OULU-NPU database
[41], the Spoofing in the Wild (SiW) database [9] and the
ROSE-YOUTU database [1].
1) CASIA FASD: The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database
(CASIA for short) has 20 and 30 subjects in its training and
testing set respectively. For each subject, there are 12 videos,
among which 3 genuine face videos are recorded from the
genuine faces and 9 spoofing face videos from photos and
screens. As such, the CASIA database has 600 videos in total.
2) IDIAP REPLAY-ATTACK: The IDIAP REPLAY-
ATTACK database [3] (IDIAP for short) is constituted of
1,200 videos in total, with 360, 360 and 480 videos in the
training set, development set, and testing set, respectively.
In this database, there are two illumination conditions: 1) a
controlled condition where the background is uniform and
the source of lighting is a fluorescent lamp; 2) an adverse
condition where the background is non-uniform and the
source of lighting is daylight. The attack videos of each
subject involve the 1) Print Attack: High-resolution face
pictures printed on a paper. 2) Replay Attack: High-resolution
pictures or videos were displayed on the screen of an iPhone
3GS and an iPad. To collect such data, the webcam of a
MacBook, an iPhone 3GS and a Canon PowerShot camera
are used.
3) MSU MFSD: The MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database
(MSU for short) [17] consists of 280 video clips of photo
and video attack from 35 subjects. Two types of cameras are
used to collect videos: the built-in camera in MacBook Air 13
(640× 480) and the front-facing camera in the Google Nexus
5 Android phone (720×480). However, all the videos are only
collected in normal indoor lighting environments.
4) OULU-NPU: The OULU-NPU database, similar to the
IDIAP database, is divided into the training, development,
and testing set with 20, 15, and 20 subjects, respectively.
Overall, it contains 4950 face videos collected under three
different environment conditions (e.g., different illumination
and background conditions), with the frontal cameras of six
mobile phones. As for attack mediums, two printers and
two display devices were used to produce print attack and
video attack examples. Furthermore, the OULU-NPU database
provides four protocols for evaluation. Among them, Protocol
1, 2, and 3 aim to evaluate a model’s generalization capability
to unseen environment conditions, unseen attack mediums,
and unseen camera modules, respectively. Protocol 4 simul-
taneously considers the unseen environment conditions, attack
mediums, and camera modules.
5) SiW: The Spoofing in the Wild (SiW for short) database
[9] covers 165 subjects. For each subject, eight genuine face
videos and 20 spoofing face videos are recorded. As for
data collection environments, four sessions with variations of
distances, poses, illuminations, and expressions have been con-
sidered [9]. For print attack examples, an HP Color LaserJet
M652 printer is for printing high resolution (5184 × 3456)
and low resolution (1920 × 1080) photos. Besides, four e-
devices (Samsung Galaxy S8, iPhone 7, iPad Pro, and PC
ASUS MB168B) are used to collect spoofing faces on their
screens. As for cameras, a Canon EOS T6 and a Logitech
C920 webcam are utilized to capture data. Totally, the SiW
database has up to 4478 genuine and spoofing face videos.
Also, it offers three protocols to evaluate the generalization
capability of a model to unseen face poses and expressions
(Protocol 1), unseen attack producing mediums (Protocol 2),
and unseen Presentation Attack types (Protocol 3).
6) ROSE-YOUTU: The ROSE-YOUTU Face Liveness De-
tection Database (ROSE-YOUTU for short) is collected by
the industry partner, YouTu. It involves 20 subjects, and for
each subject, there are 25 genuine and 150 to 200 spoofing
face videos. The data is diversely collected, covering up to 5
different lighting conditions. Also, the front-facing cameras of
five mobile devices (Hasee phone, Huawei phone, ZTE phone,
iPad, iPhone 5s) were used to record the videos, with resolu-
tion ranging from 640×480 to 1280×720. Moreover, besides
6TABLE I
THE PARAMETERS OF EACH MODULE IN THE FRAMEWORK. “2D CONV”
DENOTES THE A SEQUENCE OF A 2D CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER, A 2D
BATCH NORMALIZATION LAYER AND A RELU LAYER. “LINEAR” DENOTES
A SEQUENCE OF A FULLY-CONNECTED LAYER AND A RELU LAYER.
“GAP” DENOTES THE GLOBAL AVERAGE POOLING LAYER. THE INPUT
AND OUTPUT SIZES OF EACH LAYER ARE SHOWN. p IS THE PATCH SIZE
FOR THE CROPPING.
Module Layer Type Size
Backbone
1 2D Conv In: 3× 256× 256Out: 64× 256× 256
2 MaxPooling In: 64× 256× 256Out: 64× 128× 128
3 Residual Block ×2 In: 64× 128× 128Out: 64× 64× 64 ,
4 Residual Block ×2 In: 64× 64× 64Out: 128× 32× 32
Branch 1
1 Residual Block ×2 In: 128× 32× 32Out: 256× 32× 32
2 Residual Block ×2 In: 256× 32× 32Out: 512× 32× 32
3 GAP In: 512× 32× 32Out: 512× 1× 1
Branch 2
L21 2D Conv + GAP
In: 128× p× p
Out: 256× 1× 1
L22 Linear
In: 256
Out: 512
L23 Linear
In: 2
Out: 512
L24 Linear
In: 512
Out: 512
L25 Linear
In: 512
Out: 512
GRU GRU In: 512Out: 512
piθ Linear
In: 512
Out: 512
FC 1 Linear In: 1024Out: 2
(still and quivering) printed photos and replay video examples
(displayed with Lenovo LCD screen and Mac screen), the
ROSE-YOUTU database further includes various paper mask
attack examples. Such attacks can contain 3D information but
are lacked in the aforementioned five databases. Hence, we
leverage the ROSE-YOUTU database to evaluate our method
further.
B. Experiments Settings
1) Evaluation protocols and metrics: When evaluating
the proposed framework, we report the experimental re-
sults in terms of Equal Error Rate (EER), Half-Total Error
Rate (HTER), Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER), Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER), and Average Classification Error Rate (ACER)
in different scenarios. For intra-database experiments on the
CASIA, IDIAP, and ROSE-YOUTU databases, we use data
of the training set of the given database to train models and
report EER results on the corresponding testing sets. When
conducting cross-database experiments, we report HTER. Be-
sides, for the OULU-NPU and SiW databases, we respectively
follow the four protocols [41] and the three protocols [9]
to evaluate the generalization capability of our method by
reporting ACER, APCER, and BPCER results.
2) Implementation Details: As for the framework input, we
consider including background information as spoofing-related
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE MODELS WITH ONLY
GLOBAL FEATURES (BRANCH 1), WITH ONLY LOCAL FEATURES (BRANCH
2) AND WITH BOTH FUSED ON THE CASIA, ROSE-YOUTU,
REPLAY-ATTACK AND THE FOUR PROTOCOLS (P1, P2, P3, P4) OF
OULU-NPU DATABASES. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS
OF EER (%). THE BEST RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE
EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8 AND T = 8.
Methods Only local features Only global features Fused (ours)
CASIA 3.26 0.66 0.17
IDIAP 2.54 0.88 0.00
ROSE-YOUTU 8.06 5.42 1.79
OULU-NPU-P1 6.70 4.06 2.58
OULU-NPU-P2 5.33 3.08 1.15
OULU-NPU-P3 3.38±3.78 2.21±1.48 1.18±1.19
OULU-NPU-P4 11.23± 5.94 5.07±1.78 3.12±2.01
clues are diverse and may not necessarily appear on face
areas, which can be implemented by expanding face detection
bounding boxes to crop out faces. However, there are various
attack scenarios, and optimal bounding box sizes could depend
on scenarios. Since the entire video frames can be regarded
as the detected face cropped by the bounding box of a special
configuration, we use such configuration by default for the
framework input as a consistent way to evaluate the proposed
framework. Nevertheless, we also evaluate the effectiveness
of the framework under different configurations of bounding
boxes, where the framework inputs are consistently resized to
256 × 256 pixels. Then, the backbone network embeds the
input into feature maps F ∈ R128×32×32. Subsequently, F is
forwarded to Branch 1 and Branch 2 to extract global and
local features respectively. For the final classification, we fuse
the global and local features from Branch 1 and 2 by using the
Concatenation as the input of the final Fully Connected (FC)
layer. We show the details of the backbone network, Branch
1, Branch 2, and the final FC layer in Table I, where p denotes
the size for cropping patches.
When training the framework, we follow the two-stage
training scheme stated in Section III. At the first stage, we
pretrain a ResNet18 model [36] with cross-entropy loss with
training data. The trained parameters of the first convolutional
layer and the four subsequent residual blocks are then loaded
to the backbone, and the parameters of the backbone will be
fixed and excluded from the second-stage optimization. At the
second stage, the GRU’s hidden state ht is initialized as fg ,
and the location of the initial patch is sampled from a normal
distribution whose symmetry center corresponds to the center
of the input images. Then, Branch 1 and 2 will be optimized
jointly from scratch with the standard backward propagation
with gradients of the cross-entropy loss and J(θ). By default,
except for the declaration, the input configuration is “FULL”;
the number of observation steps T is set as 8; the patch size p
is set as 8; and the fusion method is set as the Concatenation.
In addition, we also explore the impacts of p, T , and different
fusion methods in Section IV-C.
C. Experimental results
1) Analysis of Jointly Using Global and Local Features:
In this subsection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
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Fig. 5. The statistics of the false acceptance examples on the ROSE-YOUTU
database [1]. The horizontal axis denotes the presentation attack mediums,
and the vertical axis indicates the number of falsely accepted examples. “Mc”
indicates a paper mask with two eyes and mouth cropped out. “Mf” indicates
a paper mask without cropping. “Mu” indicates a paper mask with the upper
part cut in the middle. “Pq” indicates a quivering printed paper. “Ps” indicates
a still printed paper. “Vl” indicates a video that records a Lenovo LCD display.
“Vm” indicates a video that records a Mac LCD display. Some examples of
“Vm” and “Vl” can be seen in Fig. 1.
proposed framework by jointly utilizing global and local
features. To this end, we ablate Branch 1 and Branch 2
separately to compare results with only local features and with
only global features. As shown in Table II, the results with only
global features (Branch 2 ablated) are better than the results
with only local features (Branch 1 ablated), which indicates
that global features can be more effective than local features.
Intuitively, people are likely to provide a reliable assessment
with a glance at the original video frame, especially when
discriminative artifacts appear, e.g., paper boundaries, bezels,
or obvious reflections. However, when given merely a few
local sub-patches, human beings could have trouble assessing
the liveness of the original examples as discriminative artifacts
may be absent in these patches. This is just like what the
story Blind Men and An Elephant [42] tells. Moreover, by
fusing the global and local features, our proposed framework
can further achieve better performance. Such improvement
supports our motivation that “taking closer observations at
local sub-patches” can provide more information to refine the
classification.
For further analysis, we collect the statistical results of the
falsely accepted examples for each medium on the ROSE-
YOUTU database. Fig. 5 shows that, with only global features,
the number of falsely-accepted “Vm” (video attack recorded
from a Mac display) is nearly 9000, which represents the
largest proportion. By carefully reviewing the data in the
ROSE-YOUTU database, we find that the visual quality of
“Vm” is generally better than that of “Vl” (video attack
recorded from a Lenovo display) as the resolution of a Mac
display (2560 × 1600 resolution) is much higher than that
of a Lenovo LCD (1920 × 1080 resolution). For instance,
Fig. 1(c) and is a “Vl” example, and Fig. 1(e) is a “Vm”
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 6. Illustrations of the faces cropped by bounding boxes of different
configurations. (a) is the entire original video frame of a spoofing example
from the OULU-NPU database, which can be regarded as the face image
cropped by a bounding box with a special configuration (“FULL”). (b) is the
detected face cropped from (a) by a bounding box with the default setting of
the dlib’s CNN detector (α = 0.0). Analogously, (c) is that by 20% (α = 0.2),
(d) is that by 40% (α = 0.4), and (e) is that by 60% (α = 0.6).
TABLE III
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESNET18 BASELINE AND OUR
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK. THE ACER (%) RESULTS ARE REPORTED ON
THE FOUR PROTOCOLS (P1, P2, P3, P4) OF THE OULU-NPU DATABASE.
THE BEST RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS,
WE SET p = 8 AND T = 8.
Method
ACER
P1 P2 P3 P4
ResNet18 (α = 0.0) 4.0 4.5 7.2±7.0 10.4±6.0
ResNet18 (α = 0.2) 5.3 3.3 4.8±5.0 9.4±7.1
ResNet18 (α = 0.4) 2.4 3.6 4.5±4.1 7.4±3.8
ResNet18 (α = 0.6) 2.3 3.7 5.1±2.4 6.3±2.6
ResNet18 (FULL) 7.2 2.3 3.4±1.3 11.4±5.1
Ours (α = 0.0) 3.7 4.0 6.4±6.9 9.5±6.6
Ours (α = 0.2) 4.4 3.0 3.9±2.3 8.6±5.6
Ours (α = 0.4) 1.6 3.4 2.9±1.4 6.0±4.6
Ours (α = 0.6) 1.4 2.6 3.1±1.8 5.0±3.7
Ours (FULL) 4.7 1.9 3.0±1.5 7.2±3.9
example. As shown, the visual quality of the “Vm” looks
better and than the “Vl”. In other words, the spoofing faces
of “Vm” visually look more similar to genuine faces than
“Vl” (as well as others). Therefore, “Vm” examples get most
falsely accepted as genuine faces than “Vl” and the others.
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 5, our method can generally
lead to fewer falsely accepted spoofing examples of various
attack mediums. Although the falsely accepted “Vm” from
our method still accounts for the largest proportion of false
acceptance, the value is nearly half of that with only global
features. This means that our method can better discriminate
spoofing examples of good visual quality by leveraging local
information from sub-patches. It corresponds to our motivation
that people can zoom in local sub-patches and explore subtle
spoofing clues to refine and confirm their assessment of
the liveness of examples. By far, we demonstrate that our
framework can better counter spoofing attacks by jointly using
global and local features. In the next subsection, we investigate
how well our framework can be generalized to inputs of other
configurations.
2) Analysis of Configurations of the Framework Input: As
our framework is proposed to exploit the discriminative infor-
mation which may not necessarily appear on face areas, we
also propose to investigate the performance by configuring the
input with different scales of information from backgrounds
based on detected faces. To this end, we propose to use a
8TABLE IV
THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR SELECTING PATCHES.
THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF EER (%). THE BEST
RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET
p = 8 AND T = 8.
EER MAX-SCORES RANDOM DRL (ours)
CASIA 0.25 0.32 0.17
IDIAP 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROSE-YOUTU 3.29 2.14 1.79
OULU-NPU-P1 3.82 3.57 2.58
OULU-NPU-P2 1.54 1.76 1.15
OULU-NPU-P3 1.20±1.03 1.38±0.94 1.18±1.12
OULU-NPU-P4 4.67 ±1.31 4.32±1.75 3.12±2.01
dlib’s CNN face detector [43] to obtain detection bounding
boxes. Subsequently, a bounding box will be expanded by
0%, 20%, 40%, and 60% (i.e., α = {0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6}) to
produce four face images that have different scales of back-
ground information. Besides, using the entire video frames
can be treated as cropping faces with a special configuration
for the bounding box, and we denote such configuration as
“FULL”. As such, there will be five groups of face images
in different configurations for the framework input, and some
of the examples are shown in Fig. 6. For experiments, we
adopt the OULU-NPU database, as it provides four protocols
for extensive evaluation. Also, we train ResNet18 models to
provide the baseline results, where only global features are
considered. The experimental results are shown in Table III.
It is obvious that our method can achieve better ACER results
than the counterparts of ResNet18 over different input config-
urations. To sum up, the experiments show that the proposed
method can still be effective in jointly using global and local
features extracted from face images that have different scales
of background information.
3) Effect of using reinforcement learning: In this subsec-
tion, we show the effectiveness of adopting deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) for selecting patches. To be more specific,
we compare our proposed DRL with the method of selecting
patches that have the max SoftMax scores (denoted as the
MAX-SCORES method), and the method of selecting patches
randomly (denoted as the RANDOM method). In the im-
plementation of the MAX-SCORES method, we pretrained
a patch-based CNN based on [29] with the training data to
infer the SoftMax scores of the patches, and those patches that
have the max SoftMax scores are selected for the framework.
Besides, in the implementation of the RANDOM method, we
use a random number generator to generate locations of the
patches to be selected. Table IV compares the performance
of the MAX-SCORES, RANDOM, and the DRL with respect
to patch selection. Regarding the IDIAP database, the MAX-
SCORES, RANDOM, and DRL methods achieve 0.00% EER,
meaning that local features can help with the final predic-
tion, regardless of how we select patches. Nevertheless, in
the other experiments based on the ROSE-YOUTU, CASIA,
and OULU-NPU databases, our proposed DRL shows the
effectiveness in selecting patches by achieving the best EER
results.
TABLE V
THE EER RESULTS OF DIFFERENT PATCH SIZE p ON THE CASIA,
ROSE-YOUTU AND PROTOCOL 1 OF THE OULU-NPU DATABASE
(OULU-NPU-P1). THE BEST RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD, AND
THE SECOND-BEST RESULTS ARE UNDERLINED. IN THE EXPERIMENTS,
WE SET T = 8.
EER CASIA ROSE-YOUTU OULU-NPU-P1
p = 2 0.35 3.92 2.29
p = 4 0.17 2.73 2.95
p = 8 0.17 1.79 2.58
p = 16 0.28 3.65 4.20
TABLE VI
THE EER RESULTS OF DIFFERENT TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATION
STEPS T ON THE CASIA, ROSE-YOUTU, AND PROTOCOL 1 OF THE
OULU-NPU DATABASE (OULU-NPU-P1). THE BEST RESULTS ARE
HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD, AND THE SECOND-BEST RESULTS ARE
UNDERLINED. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8.
EER CASIA ROSE-YOUTU OULU-NPU-P1
T = 2 0.18 1.64 3.85
T = 4 0.17 2.13 3.15
T = 8 0.17 1.79 2.58
T = 16 0.06 1.92 3.52
4) Analysis of Local Features Extraction: In this subsec-
tion, we analyze the impact of patch size p and the number
of steps T for the local feature extraction.
Effect of patch size p To analyze the effect of p, we conduct
experiments with p = {2, 4, 8, 16}, and we provide the EER
results on the CASIA, ROSE-YOUTU, and the OULU-NPU-
P1 in Table V. Regarding the CASIA database, we can see that
the EER results become better from 0.35% to 0.17% when p
increases from 2 to 8 but deteriorate when we further increase
p to 16 (0.28%). Regarding the ROSE-YOUTU database,
a similar trend can be observed that the EER performance
improves up to 1.79% EER when p increases from 2 to 8.
However, when p = 16, the EER performance drops as 3.65%
EER. Regarding the OULU-NPU-P1, the best EER is achieved
when p = 2, and the EER result of p = 8 is better than
that of p = 4 and p = 16. Therefore, the optimal p is
different for different databases, and simply increasing p may
not necessarily lead to better performance. Nevertheless, we
observe that p = 8 can achieve the desired performance in
general, and thus we fix p = 8 for all other experiments.
Effect of total number of observation steps T Besides
the size of the local patches, we are also interested in the
impact of different numbers of observation steps T . To this
end, we conduct experiments by increasing T from 2 to 16,
and the results are reported in Table VI. As we can observe,
for the CASIA database, the EER performance improves when
T increases from 2 to 16. Regarding the ROSE-YOUTU
database, the best EER result of 1.65% is achieved when
T = 2, and the second-best EER of 1.79% is achieved when
T = 8. Regarding the OULU-NPU-P1, the EER performance
improves as T changes from 2 to 8 but gets worse when
T = 16. In summary, simply increasing T does not necessarily
lead to better performance. We conjecture the reason that
when T is increased to include more patches, those patches
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THE COMPARISON BETWEEN WITH/WITHOUT THE BACKBONE FOR THE
FEATURE EMBEDDING. THE EXPERIMENTS ARE CONDUCTED ON THE
CASIA, ROSE-YOUTU, REPLAY-ATTACK, OULU-NPU DATABASES.
THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF EER (%). THE BEST
RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET
p = 8 AND T = 8.
Methods Without backbone With backbone
CASIA 7.80 0.17
IDIAP 1.13 0.00
ROSE-YOUTU 2.38 1.79
OULU-NPU-P1 8.43 2.58
OULU-NPU-P2 1.04 1.15
OULU-NPU-P3 1.15 ±1.26 1.18±1.19
OULU-NPU-P4 9.57±5.35 3.12±2.01
TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE ONE-STAGE END-TO-END
TRAINING AND OUR TWO-STAGE TRAINING ON THE CASIA DATABASE.
THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF EER (%). IN THE
EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8.
Observation
steps
One-stage Our two-stage
T = 2 20.1 0.184
T = 4 18.7 0.171
T = 8 4.32 0.171
containing less discriminative information may deteriorate the
performance. Nevertheless, we consistently choose T = 8 for
other experiments as it can lead to the best or second-best
performance in Table VI.
5) Analysis of other settings of the framework: In this
subsection, we analyze the impacts of the backbone, training
strategies, and feature fusion methods in our proposed frame-
work.
Effect of using the backbone for local features To
study the effectiveness of using the backbone for feature
embedding and local feature extraction, we also implement
the framework without the backbone for feature embedding
as a baseline, where patches are cropped at the predicted
locations from original RGB inputs instead of the embedded
feature maps. Table VII shows the results for comparison. We
observe that better performances can be achieved in general
by considering a backbone network. Such improvement in-
dicates that extracting local features from the feature maps
through the backbone can help to extract more discriminative
spoofing-related information. Moreover, the results with the
backbone on the OULU-NPU-P1 and -P4 (2.58% and 3.12%)
are significantly better than those without the backbone (8.43%
and 9.57%). As Protocol 1 and 4 involve unseen environments
in the testing data, conducting feature embedding through
the backbone network to extract local features may alleviate
environmental interference to some extent such that better
performance can be achieved.
Effect of the two-stage training Although training our
framework in an end-to-end manner is achievable, we propose
to use a two-stage training scheme to better optimize our
framework. Table VIII compares the results of the one-stage
TABLE IX
THE RESULTS ON THE CASIA DATABASE IN DIFFERENT SETTINGS OF
FUSION METHODS. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF
EER (%).
Observation steps Patch size Average Weighted Average Concatenation
T = 4
p = 4 16.1 12.3 0.184
p = 8 9.54 11.6 0.171
T = 8
p = 4 15.6 12.4 0.171
p = 8 0.132 0.172 0.171
TABLE X
INTRA-DATABASE EXPERIMENTS ON THE CASIA DATABASE AND THE
IDAIP DATABASE. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF EER
(%) AND HTER (%). “−” MEANS THE RESULT IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE
BEST RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE
SET p = 8 AND T = 8.
Method
IDIAP CASIA
EER HTER EER
CNN [7] 6.1 2.1 7.4
Color-LBP [4] 0.4 2.9 6.2
Bottleneck feature
fusion + NN [23]
0.8 0.0 5.8
MSR-ResNet [24] 0.2 0.4 3.1
DRL-FAS (ours) 0.0 0.0 0.2
end-to-end training and our proposed two-stage training. The
EER results of our two-stage training are all remarkably lower
than 0.2% for T = 2, 4, 8. However, for the one-stage training
experiments, when T = 2, the EER result is up to 20.1%.
Although the EER decreases as T increases, the best EER
result is still above 4% (T = 8), which is much higher than
all the results achieved by our two-stage training. Therefore,
Table VIII shows that our two-stage training can help achieve
better results by providing a stable environment such that the
agent can learn to extract effective features, even when T = 2.
Effect of fusion methods In this framework, the global
and local features are fused for classification. In Table IX,
we compare results among three different fusion methods,
the Average, Weighted Average [24], and Concatenation. We
observe that the EER results are all lower than 0.2% when
T = 8 and p = 8. However, when T < 8 or p < 8, the EER
results of the Average and the Weighted Average are higher
than 9%, while the result with only global features is less than
1% (shown in Table II). We conjecture the reason that the
Average and Weighted Average fuse global and local features
by averaging the elements at each dimension. When T < 8
or p < 8, the extracted local features may not be effective
enough. As a result, discriminative information contained by
global features may be distorted after the average operation.
However, when the extracted local feature is not representative
enough, the Concatenation could maintain original global
information to a larger extent. Therefore, the Concatenation
can provide stable results (all lower than 0.2% EER) under
different settings of T and p, and we fix the Concatenation as
the fusion method in other experiments.
6) Intra-database experiments: For further evaluation, we
conduct experiments on six benchmark databases and compare
our proposed method with state-of-the-art methods.
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TABLE XI
THE INTRA-DATABASE EXPERIMENT RESULTS ON THE ROSE-YOUTU
DATABASE COMPARED WITH THE STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS. THE
PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF EER (%). THE BEST RESULT
IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8 AND
T = 8.
Method
ROSE-YOUTU
EER
CoALBP (YCBCR) [2] 17.1
CoALBP (HSV) [2] 16.4
AlexNet [1] 8.0
3D-CNN [31] 7.0
DeSpoofing [30] 12.3
DRL-FAS (ours) 1.8
TABLE XII
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AND
STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS ON THE SIW DATABASE. THE
PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF ACER (%). THE BEST
RESULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET
T = 8 AND p = 8.
Protocol Method ACER
1
Auxiliary [9] 1.00
STASN [11] 1.00
STASN+ [11] 0.30
DRL-FAS (ours) 0.00
2
Auxiliary [9] 0.57±0.69
STASN [11] 0.28±0.05
STASN+ [11] 0.15±0.05
DRL-FAS (ours) 0.00±0.00
3
Auxiliary [9] 8.31±3.81
STASN [11] 12.10±1.50
STASN+ [11] 5.85±0.85
DRL-FAS (ours) 4.51±0.00
• Protocol 1, 2, and 3 are for evaluating models’ gen-
eralization capability to unseen face poses and expres-
sions, unseen attack mediums, and unseen Presentation
Attack types, respectively.
• For experiments of Protocol 1, the testing is only
done once so there are no terms of standard deviation
Results on the CASIA database and IDIAP database
Table X provides the results of intra-database experiments on
the CASIA and IDIAP databases. On the CASIA database,
our method attains 0.17% EER, which is the best. The best
performance on the IDIAP database can also be seen from the
0% EER on the development (DEV) set and the 0% HTER on
the testing (TEST) set. On both the two benchmark databases,
our method achieves the best performance and shows its
effectiveness.
Results on the ROSE-YOUTU database Table XI com-
pares our method with the baseline methods on the ROSE-
YOUTU database. Our method can achieve the lowest EER
(1.8%), while the second-best method 3D-CNN [31] merely
achieves 7.0% EER. This shows our method’s superiority. In
addition, to evaluate how paper mask attacks in the ROSE-
YOUTU database can fail depth-based methods, we implement
the DeSpoofing method 1 [30] because it leverages depth
information for training. However, it merely achieves 12.3%
EER, which indicates that when encountering paper mask
1https://github.com/yaojieliu/ECCV2018-FaceDeSpoofing
attack examples that are with depth information, depth-based
methods could lose efficacy. By contrast, our method can still
perform favorably against the paper mask attack examples in
the ROSE-YOUTU database.
Results on the SiW database Table XII shows the ACER
results of our proposed framework and state-of-the-art meth-
ods on the SiW database. The Auxiliary method [9], with
extra depth map and rPPG signals, attains 1.0%, 0.57%, and
8.31% ACER for Protocol 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Besides,
the “STASN+” method [11] collects extra data outside the
database for data augmentation and achieves 0.3%, 0.15%
and 5.58% correspondingly. However, without extra data and
auxiliary signals but only binary labels for supervision, our
method can achieve the best results for the three protocols
(0.00%, 0.00%, and 4.51%, respectively). In addition, for
experiments of Protocol 2 and 3, our method can manage to
get the smallest standard deviation, showing better stability.
Moreover, the ACER results of all the listed methods for
Protocol 3 are much higher than the results for Protocol 1 and
2. This indicates the setting of unseen presentation attack types
is more challenging than unseen faces poses and expressions
as well as unseen attack mediums.
Results on the OULU-NPU database Table XIII compares
our proposed method with state-of-the-art ones. In Protocol
1, our method achieves 4.7% ACER, better than the “MSR-
ResNet” method (5.9%) [24], which is also based on ResNet18
[36]. In Protocol 2, our method achieves the best ACER
(1.9%). In Protocol 3, the Auxiliary method achieves the
lowest 2.9% ACER, while our method achieves a very close
ACER of 3.0%. In Protocol 4, our method achieves the
second-best ACER of 7.2%. Overall, in terms of ACER, the
DeSpoofing is better than the Auxiliary in Protocol 1 and 4,
while the Auxiliary is better than the DeSpoofing in Protocol
2 and 3. This comparison shows that there may not be a
method that is always optimal for all scenarios. Nevertheless,
our method shows its effectiveness by achieving the best or
the second-best ACER in Protocol 2, 3, and 4. Furthermore,
according to Table III, using a proper setting of face cropping
for the framework input can lead to better performance. Also,
one can always further improve the framework with advanced
neural networks and auxiliary information.
7) Cross-database experiments: We also conduct cross-
database experiments to evaluate the generalization capability
of our method to different data domains. For conciseness, “A
→B” denotes an experiment where we run the training with
the database “A” and run testing with the database “B”.
Table XIV provides the cross-database experimental results
among the CASIA, IDIAP, and MSU databases. In the experi-
ments of CASIA→IDIAP and IDIAP→CASIA, the Auxiliary
method [9] achieves the best results (27.6% and 28.4% HTER
respectively). On the other hand, our framework achieves
second-best HTER (28.4% and 33.2%). Among methods with-
out auxiliary information, such as [24], our performance is
the best. Also, in both the experiments of IDIAP→MSU and
MSU→IDIAP, we implement the DeSpoofing method [30],
and it outperforms the other baseline methods by achieving
33.2% and 27.8% HTER respectively. However, our method
can significantly surpass it with much lower HTER results
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TABLE XIII
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR THE FOUR PROTOCOLS ON THE OULU-NPU DATABASE. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF APCER
(%), BPCER (%) AND ACER (%) ON THE TESTING (TEST) SET. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8 AND T = 8. THE BEST RESULTS ARE
HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.
Protocol Method
Test
Protocol Method
Test
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
GRADANT [44] 1.3 12.5 6.9 GRADANT[44] 3.1 1.9 2.5
DeSpoofing[30] 1.2 1.7 1.5 DeSpoofing[30] 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary [9] 1.6 1.6 1.6 Auxiliary [9] 2.7 2.7 2.7
MSR-ResNet [24] 5.1 6.7 5.9 MSR-ResNet [24] 7.6 2.2 4.9
DRL-FAS (ours) 5.4 4.0 4.7 DRL-FAS (ours) 3.7 0.1 1.9
GRADANT [44] 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4 GRADANT [44] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
DeSpoofing [30] 4.0±1.8 3.8±1.2 3.6±1.6 DeSpoofing [30] 5.1±6.3 6.1±5.1 5.6±5.7
Auxiliary [9] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5 Auxiliary [9] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
MSR-ResNet [24] 3.9±2.8 7.3±1.1 5.6±1.6 MSR-ResNet [24] 11.3±3.9 9.7±4.8 9.8±4.2
DRL-FAS (ours) 4.6±3.6 1.3±1.8 3.0±1.5 DRL-FAS (ours, FULL) 8.1±2.7 6.9±5.8 7.2±3.9
• Protocol 1, 2, and 3 are for evaluating a model’s generalization capability to unseen environment conditions, unseen attack mediums, and unseen
camera modules, respectively. Protocol 4 extends the evaluation to unseen sessions, attack mediums and camera modules at the same time.
• For experiments of Protocol 1 and 2, the testing is only done once, so there are no terms of standard deviation.
TABLE XIV
INTER-DATABASE RESULTS BETWEEN THE CASIA, IDIAP AND MSU DATABASES. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF HTER (%). “−”
MEANS THE RESULT IS NOT AVAILABLE. ON THE LEFT OF “→” IS THE DATABASE USED FOR TRAINING AND ON THE RIGHT FOR TESTING. WE MARK THE
BEST RESULTS IN BOLD, AND THE SECOND-BEST RESULTS ARE UNDERLINED. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8 AND T = 8.
Method CASIA→IDIAP IDIAP→CASIA MSU→IDIAP IDIAP→MSU
LBP [45] 47.0 39.6 45.5 45.8
LBP-TOP [45] 49.7 60.6 46.5 47.5
Motion [45] 50.2 47.9 − −
CNN [7] 48.5 45.5 37.1 48.6
Color LBP [4] 37.9 35.4 44.8 33.0
Color Texture [4] 30.3 37.7 33.9 34.1
Auxiliary [9] 27.6 28.4 − −
DeSpoofing [30] 28.5 41.1 33.2 27.8
MSR-MobileNet [24] 30.0 33.4 − −
MSR-ResNet [24] 36.2 34.7 − −
DRL-FAS (ours) 28.4 33.2 29.7 15.6
TABLE XV
THE INTER-DATABASE EXPERIMENTS WHERE THE MODELS ARE TRAINED
WITH DATA OF ROSE-YOUTU DATABASE AND TESTED ON THE CASIA
AND IDIAP DATABASES. THE PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF
HTER (%). “*” MEANS THE RESULTS ARE WITH THE OUTLIER REMOVAL
PROPOSED IN [1]. ON THE LEFT OF→ IS THE DATABASE USED FOR
TRAINING AND THE RIGHT FOR TESTING. THE BEST RESULTS ARE
HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. IN THE EXPERIMENTS, WE SET p = 8 AND T = 8.
Method ROSE-
YOUTU→CASIA
ROSE-
YOUTU→IDIAP
AlexNET without DA [1] 32.6 43.6
AlexNET with KMM [1] 31.6 43.6
AlexNET with SA [1] 35.0 38.5
AlexNET with KSA [1] 33.9 42.0
AlexNET with SA* [1] 30.7 36.2
AlexNET with KSA* [1] 30.1 38.8
DeSpoofing [30] 37.2 38.5
DRL-FAS (ours) 8.1 20.0
(29.7% and 15.6%), which is the best.
Table XV provides the experimental results of ROSE-
YOUTU→CASIA and ROSE-YOUTU→IDIAP. In the exper-
iment of ROSE-YOUTU→CASIA, our method can achieve
the best 8.1% HTER. Both the ROSE-YOUTU and CASIA
database include spoofing attacks that have bezels and paper
boundaries observed. Hence, the proposed framework can cap-
ture such discriminative artifacts to achieve good performance.
Besides, as for attack samples in the IDIAP database, there
are few paper boundaries and bezels observed in the samples.
However, in the experiment of ROSE-YOUTU→IDIAP, the
proposed framework is still effective and achieves the best
HTER (20.0%), at least 16% HTER significantly lower than
the others. In summary, in the cross-database experiments,
our proposed framework still shows effectiveness when the
spoofing artifacts and backgrounds are from different data
domains.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 7. The CAM heatmaps generated with global features. (a) is a print
paper attack from the ROSE-YOUTU database, and its paper boundary is
exposed on the left. (c) is a replay video attack from the ROSE-YOUTU
database, and it has reflection patterns on the right. (e) and (g) are replay
attack examples from the IDIAP REPLAY-ATTACK database. There are no
discriminative artifacts. (b), (d), (f), and (h) are the CAM heatmaps of (a),
(c), (e), and (g) respectively, where red/blue regions mean high/low activation
(best viewed in color).
D. Visualization
In this subsection, we conduct further analysis based on
visualization. To show what types of information the global
features are likely to capture for anti-spoofing, we propose to
apply the Class Activation Mapping (CAM) [46] to visualize
activation heatmaps of global features. The CAM heatmaps
are shown in Fig. 7, where red/blue areas mean high/low
activation. Fig. 7(a) is a paper attack where the paper bound-
aries can be seen on the left and the right. Its CAM heatmap,
Fig. 7(b), shows that the boundaries of both sides give high
activation (red). Fig. 7(c) is a replay video attack with re-
flections appearing on the right, and we see from Fig. 7(d)
that the reflection areas on the top right are red. Besides,
we also explore the situation when the above artifacts are
absent. Fig. 7(e) and Fig. 7(g) are replay video attack examples
from the IDIAP database, and there are no discriminative
artifacts observed. While the face area in Fig. 7(f) gives high
activation, the background areas in Fig. 7(h) are also of high
activation. In summary, discriminative information captured by
global features may not necessarily appear on face areas, and
information from backgrounds can also significantly contribute
to anti-spoofing, even when bezels, reflections, etc., are not
observed.
Besides, we propose to investigate how the local features
can help with the performance by visualizing the predicted
locations. To this end, we propose to fuse the global fea-
ture with the local feature ht extracted at the step-index t
(t = 1, 2...8) for classification to get the confidence score
ct. In this way, the visualization results are shown in Fig. 8,
where the number under each image is the confidence score
ct. As shown in Fig. 8, the performance of confidence scores
shows an increasing trend. The first row of Fig. 8 is an attack
example from the IDIAP database, a printed paper replayed in
a video. As t increases, the predicted patches cover the printed
stripes in the background, and ct is generally increasing. The
two rows below are printed paper attack examples from the
CASIA database, where the boundaries of the printed paper
can be treated as discriminative spoofing artifacts, and the
patches also cover the paper boundaries. In these two rows,
the performance of ct shows an increasing trend. The fourth
row and fifth row are replay video attack examples from
the OULU-NPU database and the ROSE-YOUTU database,
respectively. We observe that the local patches mainly ex-
plore moir patterns. Meanwhile, there are c6 > c7 for the
fourth and c3 > c4 for the fifth respectively, indicating that
simply increasing t may not necessarily further improve the
performance. Nevertheless, for t > 1, that ct > c1 still
holds, showing that the information from patches can generally
improve the overall performance.
Furthermore, we observe that the patches generally move
from the center areas toward the boundary (background) areas.
As the initial locations are sampled from a normal distribution
whose symmetry center corresponds to the center of the input
image, the initial patch is generally near the center areas.
Thereby, the RNN extracts features from the center areas first.
As spoofing features can also be found in the background
areas, driven by reinforcement learning, the patches then move
toward the background areas such that the RNN can extract
features from these areas to improve performance.
We also visualize misclassified spoofing examples from the
CASIA, ROSE-YOUTU, and OULU-NPU databases, which
are shown in Fig. 9. Fig. 9(a) is a printed paper attack from the
CASIA database. Although the paper boundary at the bottom
can be seen, it is not obvious, and most of the other areas
have no blur or distortion observed. Fig. 9(b) is a replay
video attack example from the ROSE-YOUTU database, and
Fig. 9(c) is a replay video attack example from the OULU-
NPU database. These figures show few discriminative artifacts,
such as reflection. Based on the observations from these
examples, as there are few discriminative artifacts observed,
the extracted global and local features may not be effective in
differentiating the spoofing faces from genuine ones.
E. Computational Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the computational efficiency
of our proposed method and the ResNet18. As we can see from
Table XVI, the total number of parameters of our model is
about 16.50M, while the ResNet18 is 11.18M. This increased
amount of parameters is reasonable as we introduce a local
branch in our framework and our model can achieve better
performance in the task of FAS. Despite that our model size
increases by about 50% compared with the ResNet18, our
proposed method does not introduce too much computational
burden. In terms of Multiply-Accumulate-Operations (MACs)
[47], which is for measuring the total multiplication and addi-
tion operations required for calculation, our method merely has
more 0.04 Giga (1.7%) and 0.07 (3.0%) Giga when T = 4
and T = 8 than the ResNet18 baseline. Last but not least,
we consider the inference efficiency by reporting Frames per
Second (FPS) based on PyTorch and NVIDIA GTX 1080
Ti GPU. As we can see, while the ResNet18 achieves 150
FPS, our method can achieve 110 FPS and 70 FPS when
T = 4 and T = 8, which is reasonable as the local branch
works recurrently. Nevertheless, in practice, one can always
use various neural network acceleration techniques to speed
up models.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8t
0.9716 0.9787 0.9800 0.9804 0.9807 0.9808 0.9807 0.9808
0.9894 0.9969 0.9986 0.9989 0.9990 0.9992 0.9992 0.9992
0.8245 0.8567 0.8626 0.8719 0.8789 0.8789 0.8790 0.8790
0.9217 0.9394 0.9487 0.9456 0.9432 0.9431 0.9431 0.9431
0.7737 0.7928 0.7987 0.8006 0.8026 0.8029 0.8029 0.8029
Fig. 8. Visualization of each step with the confidence score. The spoofing examples are correctly classified in the intra-database experiments. Each row
represents an example, and each column shows the predicted location at a step. The index of an observation step is denoted by t. Under each image is the
confidence score ct. The first row is a replay attack example from the IDIAP REPLAY-ATTACK database. The second and third rows are printed paper attack
example from the CASIA database. The fourth row is a replay video attack example from the OULU-NPU database. The fifth row is a replay video attack
example from the ROSE-YOUTU database.
(a) CASIA (b) ROSE-YOUTU (c) OULU-NPU
Fig. 9. Misclassification of spoofing examples. (a), (b), and (c) were
misclassified as genuine faces in the intra-database experiments on the CAISA,
ROSE-YOUTU, and OULU-NPU databases, respectively.
TABLE XVI
THE COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION OF RESNET18 AND OUR METHOD.
Method Params MACs FPS
ResNet18 11.18M 2.38G 150
Ours (T=4) 16.50M 2.42G 110
Ours (T=8) 16.50M 2.45G 70
V. CONCLUSION
We present a novel two-branch framework to explore spoof-
ing clues for face anti-spoofing problem. The novelties of
our work lie in two folds, 1) we propose to leverage CNN
and RNN to extract both global and local information for the
FAS task based on a single frame; 2) we propose a novel
optimization strategy based on deep reinforcement learning,
which is the first attempt in the FAS problem. We conduct
extensive experiments on six different databases to evaluate
our proposed framework. The experimental results on both
intra- and cross-domain indicate that our proposed framework
can generally achieve state-of-the-art performance compared
with various state-of-the-art baselines, which demonstrate the
effectiveness of our method.
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